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For more than a decade, the collaboration between two eminent scholars of an-
cient Greece and China has been well known to students of their fields. Their 
long expected book, The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early 
China and Greece, has now reached our desks. This monumental work not only 
casts new light on the two ancient civilizations, but also redefines the history of 
science and medicine. An exemplar of sophisticated scholarship, the book none-
theless is exceptionally accessible to a wide ranging audience. Sir Geoffrey Lloyd 
and Professor Nathan Sivin offer their ground-breaking discoveries from lifelong 
scholarship to the general reading public, tackling issues that are larger than 
specialists‟ arguments on specific questions. These issues include the dynamics 
and paths of the history of science, the wholeness of thought and action, and 
interactions among social structures, political authority, values and conceptions, 
and systematic inquiry. In exploring these issues, they elucidate fundamental 
questions in the history of science and methods of comparison that are inherent in 
multiple disciplines of the humanities.  
Lloyd and Sivin investigate the beginnings of science and medicine in two 
complex ancient civilizations, China and Greece. They pursue it through a com-
parison, but instead of comparing selected concepts or practices from each cul-
ture, they compare entire processes. They treat each culture as a „manifold,‟ 
namely, the continuum of intellectual, social, and institutional dimensions as well 
as the interactions uniting these dimensions into a single whole (pp. xi, 3). They 
ask questions such as what motivated thinkers in each culture, how they were 
educated and how they made a living, what their relationship was to the structure 
of authority, whom they tried to persuade and what their ways of persuasion and 
argument were, and what frames of understanding they created in each culture. 
Such comparison of the „cultural manifolds‟ manifests the authors‟ overall as-
sumptions of historical inquiry. They abandon questions that have occupied most 
of our comparative histories, such as who did what first and why China (suppos-
edly) did not develop science (or philosophy or religion). Instead, they see the 
history of science, as well as any other species of history, as unfolding from dif-
ferent cultural manifolds, each having its own way and pattern of development. 
They describe such processes of history as depending on hope, effort, and chance, 
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rather than destiny or some ineluctable pull exerted by modern knowledge (p. 
xiii). Therefore, they argue that modern natural science is a multilinear descend-
ant of many technical cultures, from Persian, Indian, Islamic, Chinese, Greek, 
and other civilizations. 
The book is organized in six simple chapters, with an appendix on the evolu-
tion of the Chinese cosmological synthesis. The introduction (chapter one) lays 
out the grounds for comparison. There are basic similarities between ancient 
China and Greece: both evolved elaborate cultures; people in both societies saw 
the need for systematic inquiry into the natural world; specialist groups in both 
societies were leading such inquiries; and such inquiries were intensely value-
laden. Within these broad similarities lie important differences, such as their 
varied responses to the legacy of tradition, the distinct roles and ambitions of 
their thinkers, the particular conditions under which the thinkers worked and 
specific values they exemplified, and their special techniques of persuasion as 
well as their designated audiences. Differentiating „ancient science‟ from modern 
science in terms of method and institution, the chapter defines the former as the 
„bid to comprehend aspects of the physical world,‟ including stars, the human 
body, animals and plants, and the composition of things and the changes they 
undergo (p. 4). The authors ask, as their first step of inquiry, what the ancient 
investigators themselves said about their subject matter and aims. This is a com-
plete turn away from the convention of counting up ancient accomplishments 
according to modern criteria. The materials for comparing China and Greece 
range from about 400 BC to 200 AD. These rich materials contain amazing coun-
terparts. One can set Euclid and Ptolemy side by side with Chinese treatises on 
mathematics and medicine. Equally interesting is the lack of equivalence between 
the two cultures in other areas, such as Aristotle‟s writings on physics or animals, 
or the Chinese writings on resonance and ch’i. 
The four chapters on comparison are divided evenly, with two on Chinese and 
two on Greek civilization. The two parallel stories each move from the livelihood 
of thinkers, at the social end of the manifold, to scientific and medical concepts at 
the intellectual end. Chapter two describes the social and institutional framework 
of China. To become a philosopher or scientist depended primarily on birth with-
in the elite group eligible for office, called shih 士. In the continued political 
turbulence around 400 BC, the shih had changed from being aristocratic warriors 
to depend on official employment or patronage for their livelihood, using their 
literacy and other expertise. The key to status and privilege was education, and 
access to it continued to depend on birth. Literacy remained a clear class distinc-
tion, common among the elite and out of reach for commoners. Consequently, 
philosophers and scientists generally were from the elite class. Patronage at local 
courts did not give philosophy a place of particular importance; it treated philos-
ophers as just one kind of retainer or guest, among a wide variety of pragmatic 
experts or technicians. The imperial state that replaced this monarchical patron-
age provided official employment to the intellectuals and technicians, but be-
cause of the state‟s interests in a narrowly defined orthodoxy, the philosophers 
134 EASTM 22 (2004) 
who depended on state patronage and employment ended up accepting the ortho-
doxy. The state control and subsidizing of the sciences also made scientific and 
medical authors conform to the ideology and accept the priorities of the state.  
Such a social structure affected the community of learning, the inquiries they 
pursued, and the modes of argument. „Individuality,‟ in its strict definition, was 
hardly found among thinkers, since identification with a group and aspiration 
toward an imagined orthodoxy was the Chinese norm (pp. 43-44). Education was 
largely a matter of collectivities, based on the kinship of master and disciples, 
and centered on a written book and its memorization. Various traditions of 
thought were actually lineages of textual transmission, and each saw ideas as 
embodied in its founder or a line of masters. Such communities were held togeth-
er by a belief of common descent rather than the like-mindedness of philosophers 
or an academic institution as in the Greek case. In science and medicine, text-
centered master-pupil lineages also emerged from the first century BC on, adapt-
ing the philosophical classics to technical traditions and maintaining a patrimony 
of ancient sages as the source of wisdom and technical innovations. Neither pat-
ronage and official appointment nor the lineage community encouraged confron-
tation. Open, face-to-face debate was rare and reserved mostly for politics. Disa-
greement was mostly muted or indirect. Arguments were expressed mostly in 
writing, addressed to rulers rather than peers. The ideas of thinkers and scientists 
were expressed in many types of writing. Classics, canons, and memorials have 
no counterparts in Greece, while dialogues, treatises, and commentaries were 
created in both cultures, though each used them quite differently.  
Chapter three addresses these same questions about the social and institution-
al framework in Greece. The fundamental division of Greco-Roman society was 
“between slave and free.” (p. 82) Among the free, further distinctions were made 
by birth and wealth. The rise of city-states and changes in the style of warfare had 
weakened the power of the ancient noble families, but birth into an aristocratic 
family remained important for potential leaders. Wealth was the main division 
among the free, and the way rich and poor were treated differentiated oligarchies 
from democracies. While the former denied the poor the right to hold office, the 
latter insisted that all free citizens were equal. The social structure depended on a 
minimal literacy of the citizens, and elementary education was regular and not 
restricted to any particular group. Unlike China, Greece had no scribal class, 
education did not serve to maintain the status of a literate elite class, and libraries 
were not handed on by lineages nor reserved for the exclusive use of palace offi-
cials. The social origins of philosophers and scientists, therefore, were much 
more diverse than in China. They ranged from the wealthy and aristocratic end—
as exemplified by Plato—to slave families, including Epictetus and Bion. Doc-
tors, engineers, and other experts could be found among slaves and in every stra-
tum of society. A large number of philosophers and scientists came from poor 
and middle range families, among them Aristotle and Socrates. Becoming a phi-
losopher or scientist depended less on birth or wealth than on personal ambition 
and determination. The livelihood of these philosophers and scientists came pri-
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marily from practical activities or teaching. Patronage of philosophy by rulers or 
the wealthy was limited and irregular, while patronage of doctors and engineers 
was more substantial. Compared to the Chinese, Greek intellectuals were far 
more isolated from political power, their professions were not bureaucratized, 
and they did not need birth, wealth, or education as entitlements to their profes-
sion.  
Within this social structure, philosophers and scientists were not concerned 
about securing a patron as much as making a reputation among colleagues. Phi-
losophers before Plato were generally strongly individualistic, negating any col-
lectivity. Plato‟s Academy and other schools established after were private insti-
tutions. The pluralism within each school and competitiveness among them made 
argument and debate their essential activity. Differences of opinion were ex-
plored and exploited. A similar situation existed in science and medicine. Before 
the Hellenistic period, there was a high degree of individualism among doctors 
and there were no medical schools or sects. In the Hellenistic period, medical 
sects were pluralist and competitive, and no group of medical theorists claimed 
themselves Dogmatists. These philosophical and medical schools were held to-
gether as collegial bodies, for purposes of argument or disputation, and func-
tioned to serve the ambitions of their own members more than of rulers. Pupils 
were intent on making their own reputations rather than defending the teacher, 
and deviation and defection were common. Greek philosophers and scientists 
expressed their ideas mainly in debate, lectures, and writing. As much writing as 
the Greeks created, intellectual exchange was mostly in the oral mode. Competi-
tive debates in front of a lay audience were the format for the presentation of 
ideas. Argumentative debate using both rhetoric and dialectic was a preoccupa-
tion of Greek culture, as the major way of producing, transmitting and developing 
ideas. Adversariality also existed in more technical writings of treatises and 
commentaries, even though the sense of an ongoing debate was less exhibited.  
Both the social framework and the mode of argument affected the content of 
Greek theories, and chapter four investigates the history of some fundamental 
questions of Greek philosophy and science. The concepts of elements, nature, 
and reality appeared in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, when the fierce compe-
tition for intellectual prestige drove philosophers and scientists to formulate their 
own focal problems. They often claimed their theories as their own inventions, 
rather than being handed down from ancient sages as in Chinese culture. Compet-
ing against traditionalists, these new Masters of Truth demarcated their subject 
matter as the natures of things that can be investigated (p. 156). Among these 
new Masters, however, the investigable nature was also disputed. Arguments 
about causation linked directly to Greece‟s legal context and this link influenced 
both philosophy and science, provided models for intellectual inquiry, and culti-
vated rigorous demonstration which was lacking in the Chinese context. Ideas 
about the cosmos show more similarities between China and Greece: both views 
on the cosmos were value-laden; both mirrored the macrocosm in the microcosms 
of the body and the state; and both represented the cosmos as a harmonic and 
136 EASTM 22 (2004) 
ordered whole. But beneath the similarities, the two civilizations differed in the 
understanding of questions as well as in the answers given. The Chinese agreed 
that a benevolent ruler was the guarantor of cosmic harmony, while the Greeks 
exploited a variety of models of political constitutions. The Chinese view of the 
hierarchy of things was that of interdependence between binary opposites such as 
yin and yang or low and high, while the Greeks viewed such opposites as inde-
pendent from one another. Human rulers were held responsible for cosmic har-
mony in China, while the Greeks saw rational forces controlling the cosmos in-
dependent of human activity or responsibility. The development of the fundamen-
tal questions of nature, causes, elements, and the cosmos, therefore, was influ-
enced by Greek legal practice, political experience, and social circumstances that 
encouraged competition and argument rather than cooperation and consensus.  
In China, chapter five reveals, such fundamental questions were motivated by 
a one-way discourse aimed at rulers, rather than open competition among peers. 
The study of cosmology or medicine was attributed to some sagely origin, and 
the stress was on moral and political relevance rather than objective reality. 
Seekers of the Way of the cosmos saw inquiry as self-cultivation, as embodiment 
of the Way, which included but went well beyond empirical and cognitive under-
standing. Chinese cosmology developed in three stages, each maintaining the 
centrality of the ruler. Around 400 BC, local rulers began to rely on experts for 
communication with Heaven and Earth and these experts devised diverse sets of 
numerical categories to link social entities and activities with phenomena in na-
ture. A succession of scholars in the following century turned these resources 
toward a new double aim: providing polities with a cosmic basis and persuading 
rulers to entrust much of their authority to their bureaucracies. In the early impe-
rial era, the second stage, philosophers such as Lü Pu-wei, Liu An, and Tung 
Chung-shu systematically used certain widely circulating concepts—ch’i, yin-
yang, and five „agents‟—to build philosophical doctrines of the cosmos, the state, 
and the body. A fully developed cosmological doctrine, appearing in the third 
stage during the first century BC, finally unified ch’i, yin-yang and the five 
„agents‟ as a single complex of dynamic transformation, as demonstrated in Yang 
Hsiung‟s Supreme Mystery and the anonymous medical treatise Inner Canon of 
the Yellow Emperor. In this development the Chinese did not need terms to de-
scribe „nature‟ (the physical or material universe). Instead, they saw the body and 
the state as microcosms of a single cosmic order, and their central concern was 
the ruler who could maintain resonance between Heaven and Earth. The sciences 
supported by the state further elaborated this philosophical synthesis. Astrono-
mers calculated celestial movements and interpreted heavenly omens to influence 
political decisions. Physicians used microcosm to explain therapeutic experience. 
The influence of state support and the lack of competition explain why Chinese 
philosophers and scientists sought general agreement on basic issues instead of 
competition and used existing courtly discourse rather than coining new concepts.  
The final chapter returns to the strategic questions raised in the introduction: 
Why did China and Greece produce the sciences they did? What can this study 
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tell us about the ways science developed in antiquity? The chapter answers with 
seven points of comparison and conclusion: 1) The fundamental concepts in play 
in China and in Greece were strikingly dissimilar. Greeks focused on nature and 
elements, and their main concern was to make a reputation for their competence 
and superiority as new Masters. Chinese focused on tao, ch’i, yin-yang, and the 
five „agents‟, and their concern was to advise and guide rulers. 2) The livelihood 
of Greek philosophers and scientists rarely depended on government employment 
or patronage, as they earned their living by teaching or by practicing their tech-
nical skills. Their Chinese counterparts, in contrast, relied mainly on rulers‟ pat-
ronage or official employment. 3) The applications of cosmology and science 
were a state concern in China, while the Greek city-states were not keen on such 
applications. Chinese agreed on the role of the ruler as mediator between heaven 
and earth, and the state and cosmos formed a seamless whole. Greeks, however, 
did not agree on the best kind of political constitution nor on what type of politi-
cal structure the cosmos was or resembled. 4) Pluralism was generally limited in 
China due to central rule, while in Greece it was not just possible but even man-
datory, since intellectuals had to make a name for themselves and aggressive 
innovation was a means to do so. 5) A public sphere—either serving as a tool of 
imperial control or representing elite interests that sometimes opposed the ruler—
engaged most Chinese intellectuals, while the sphere of operation for most Greek 
intellectuals was the private, in that their reputation depended on self-
presentation rather than the personal favor of a ruler. 6) Disagreement and dispu-
tation were encouraged in Greek culture, while consensus was emphasized in 
China. 7) The Greek ways of persuasion were face-to-face oral debates in front of 
a public, whereas Chinese ways of persuasion, often in written form, were di-
rected at the rulers rather than colleagues or the public. The answer to the strate-
gic questions, supported by this comparison, is that neither China nor Greece had 
a monopoly on the wherewithal to develop science. Each exhibited its own dis-
tinctive potential for the pursuit of such investigations. The dominant Greek way 
was through the search for foundations, the demand for demonstration, for incon-
trovertibility. The principal Chinese approach was to find and explore corre-
spondences, resonances, interconnections. Each approach had its strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
This is an extraordinary book, the kind that comes along only once in so many 
years. It presents lavish information and profound knowledge through graceful 
writing and lucid arguments, and it lures the reader with fascination into the an-
cient worlds of science and medicine, which have been abstruse and forbidding 
for non-specialists. While providing the general public with an exceptional com-
bination of sophistication and accessibility, the book is also seminal in two highly 
specialized fields. Specialists will find many arguments in this book provocative 
and will also benefit tremendously from the book‟s extensive historical and com-
parative framework, where his or her own topic of research could be situated. 
Between the public and the specialists, above all, the book has revolutionized 
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comparative methodology and the conception of the history of science, both of 
which have an impact on various humanistic disciplines.  
Comparison has been a method of inquiry for many disciplines. For example, 
sinology—the study of Chinese language, culture, and history from outside Chi-
na—is intrinsically comparative. Much of its analytical vocabulary and concep-
tion of questions has been developed through Euro-American concepts and para-
digms. In decoding ancient Chinese culture, the implicit question is often how 
„China‟ differs from both the historical and the modern „West.‟ Similarly, the 
study of ancient Greece cannot avoid questions of its similarities with the modern 
West and its difference from other ancient civilizations. In the twentieth century, 
disciplines explicitly crowned with the word “comparative” mushroomed—
comparative sociology, comparative history, comparative philosophy, and com-
parative literature. While comparison has been a shared, elementary, and essen-
tial method of inquiry, it has often been achieved at a high cost. One cost has 
been historical change of the subject. The comparison of two cultures, or certain 
parts from them, has been achieved most often through various a-historical gen-
eralizations or abstractions of cultural types, if not blatant essentialism. Historical 
change, and the internal conflicts, contradictions, and dynamics that cause the 
changes in cultural structures and concepts, have been either pushed into the 
„background‟ or simply excluded as noise or distraction. A second cost has been 
the larger cultural and social context. Certain philosophical concepts, social ele-
ments, or cultural phenomena have been regularly taken out of their social-
cultural whole, to be compared with an equally decontextualized counterpart 
from another culture. And a third cost has been the human agent. Comparisons of 
formative or structural features of cultures or cultural elements seldom address 
the human agent responsible for their existence and change. These internal meth-
odological flaws have aggravated the external challenges to comparative studies 
from globalism and postmodernism, which often deny the plurality of cultural 
worlds and deconstruct cultures as distinct entities altogether.1  This partially 
explains the declining interest in comparative subjects, reflected in a shift to-
wards „intercultural‟ or „trans-cultural‟ questions instead.  
Way and Word has appeared just in time to vigorously renew comparative 
methods and comparative problematics. The idea of „cultural manifolds‟ helps 
rectify all three flaws just mentioned. It puts historical process, human agents, 
and interactions among aspects of a single yet dynamic cultural whole into the 
foreground as primary subjects of investigation. Throughout the book we learn 
about the philosophers, scientists, and specialists, their livelihood and motiva-
tions, their social and intellectual environments, why they made the choices they 
made and under what historical circumstances, as well as how their lives and 
ideas changed over time. With this book setting such a model, one sees how 
                                                 
1 For the challenge of globalism to comparative studies of cultures, see for example 
Haun Saussy, Great Walls of Discourse and other Adventures in Cultural China (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), chaps. 2, 6. 
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comparative studies can still contribute to humanistic knowledge while avoiding 
the pitfalls of conventional comparative methodology. 
In addition to these innovations in methodology, the book also breaks new 
ground in the history of science. History of science has long been dominated by 
the common conception of “science” as a unique modern phenomenon—the 
„normative,‟ „positive,‟ or „universal‟ science that is „the quintessential form of 
rationality,‟ both a cause and an effect of modernity.2 Science in this modern and 
Western conception is defined as systematic inquiry into the physical and natural 
world through experimentation, measurement, and verification. And history of 
science serves to chronicle when and by whom each contemporary scientific fact, 
law, and theory was discovered or invented. Discontent with this unhistorical 
conception of science and the concept of a „development-by-accumulation‟ mod-
el of history, Thomas Kuhn proposed, four decades ago, that a “new concept will 
not be forthcoming if historical data continue to be sought and scrutinized mainly 
to answer questions posed by the unhistorical stereotype drawn from science 
texts.”3 Since then, the history of science in the modern Western context has been 
rewritten. The sole drive for the production of scientific knowledge—namely 
objective, value-free, and pure rationality—has been seriously deconstructed. 
The Frankfurt School of Critical Sociology uncovered social conditions, political 
processes, and the power of domination in the production and use of scientific 
knowledge.4 Marcuse explores the „instrumentalistic‟ character of modern sci-
ence, stating that scientific and technological rationality protects the „legitimacy 
of domination‟ of those who control the productive use of technology.5 Harber-
mas further terms such instrumental use of science and technology a form of 
„ideology‟—a specific form of political domination.6 Foucault unveils “the polit-
ical status of science and the ideological functions it could serve” in his simple 
equation of power/knowledge.7 Anthropologist Stanley Tambiah further points to 
the monopoly effect of science invading all domains of human life, „imperialisti-
cally‟ expanding to fill all the moral or social space in which we live, and depriv-
                                                 
2 For a critique of the concept of modern science, see Stanley J. Tambiah, Magic, Sci-
ence, Religon, and the Scope of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), pp. 140-144. 
3 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1970), pp. 1-2. 
4 For a summary of the Frankfurt School critique of scientific rationality, and the 
summary views of Marcuse, Harbermas, and Foucault, see Tambiah (1990), pp. 2, 145-
147. 
5 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1964), chap. 
6. 
6  Jürgen Harbermas, Toward a Rational Society, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: 
Heinemann, 1974), chap. 6. 
7 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 108. 
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ing other modes of consciousness or other world orientations any space for exist-
ence. The same process has also been progressively carving up the wholeness of 
life into separate domains of specialized knowledge and territories, corroding any 
existing unifying cosmology and the unifying themes of purposive life.8 This 
process of simultaneous monopolization of moral and social space and fragmen-
tation of human life has concerned many Post-modern theorists. 
While such theorists have deeply altered our views of modern science, Way 
and Word revolutionizes the history of science by rewriting its beginning. It re-
places the unilinear evolution of science from the Greek tradition with a multi-
linear history of many technical traditions. It negates the single direction towards 
modern natural science as the fate of all histories of scientific and technical tradi-
tions, and proposes a new model that views history as undetermined or stochastic. 
Instead of asking which culture discovered more facts or methods similar to 
modern science, it raises new questions for the ancient histories. These questions 
coincide with those aimed at the modern conditions mentioned above. Way and 
Word inquires into the social production and social use of scientific knowledge in 
ancient civilizations. It brings into the picture interest groups and patronage, 
modes of living and motivations, communities of science and their relationship to 
political power, economic conditions, social prestige, and how these affected the 
modes of argument and fundamental issues and conceptions of scientific inquiry. 
These innovations point clearly to a future course of research. Within the study of 
ancient Chinese and Greek civilizations, and after the century-long splitting of 
the subject matter into segregated disciplines, the holistic and interactive rela-
tions between knowledge and society, between thought and action, are now in 
great need of reconstruction. For the history of science, the book calls for further 
testing of its new models, methods, and hypotheses in relation to other ancient 
and early modern cultures.  
Way and word is a monument of history of science and medicine, and a great 
contribution to humanistic research. It should be widely read by both specialists 
of early civilizations and historians of science, as well as anyone with intellectual 
interest in the wholeness of knowledge and society and the pluralistic develop-
ment of history. 
 
                                                 
8 Tambiah (1990), pp. 149-151. 
